Who’s Keeping You Quiet?

Fear of people’s reactions can lead us to self-censor

This post at Psychology Today  picks up Kristie Dotson’s work on testimonial smothering as a form of silencing.  I have been using Dotson’s ideas as part of my book project on trustworthiness and competence, particularly in considering how we judge competence in others.  I also briefly discuss these ideas in a forthcoming chapter on trust, distrust and epistemic injustice, for the Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, edited by Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus Jr.

Why Someone’s Disappointment Hurts More than Their Anger

Why is it so painful to hear ‘I’m disappointed in you’?

This post at Psychology Today was initially published as: ‘I’m Not Angry, I’m Just Disappointed’ (authors select initial titles and images, but these are sometimes edited).

This post was prompted by my research for a forthcoming chapter on trust, distrust and epistemic injustice.  For the chapter, idea was that we can harm people by extending either trust or distrust when neither is appropriate, but also that we can harm people by taking an overly-dispassionate attitude (neither trust nor distrust) when something more engaged would be appropriate.  (As I have argued elsewhere, these mistakes are easily overlooked when we focus on mistakenly trusting when distrust is due, or mistakenly distrusting when trust is due.)  For the post, I used Strawson on reactive attitudes to think about why sometimes engaged anger is more easily received than disengaged disappointment or disdain.  (Reading Darwall was also very helpful.)

On further reflection, I think there is much more to say about all this, perhaps via connections with objectification…maybe one day.

Feeling a Fraud? It’s Not Your Fault!

What if a toxic workplace environment is making you feel like an imposter?  Blogpost at Psychology Today.

This post is based on a talk I gave at LMU Munich in July 2016 (video here), questioning whether ‘imposter feelings’ are typically irrational in unsupportive social environments  This draws on my book manuscript about trustworthinesss and competence, in particular discussions of the value of accurate self-assessment. Useful sources include:

‘The Imposter Phenomenon’ by Jaruwan Sakulku and James Alexander, International Journal of Behavioral Science 6.1, 73-92 (2011).


Tough Love

Sometimes too much trust is exactly what our friends don’t need.  Post at Psychology Today.

This post is about whether we owe epistemic partiality to our friends, drawing on

Keller, Simon (2004): ‘Friendship and Belief’, Philosophical Papers, 33 (3):329-351.

Stroud, Sarah (2006): ‘Epistemic Partiality in Friendship’ Ethics 116 (3):498-524.

Hawley, Katherine (2012): ‘Partiality and Prejudice in Trusting‘, Synthese (9):1-17 (2012).  (Preprint available here.)

What is Epistemology?

In April 2016 I gave a lecture on this topic, for graduate students in arts and humanities. Here (at the blog of the Scottish Graduate School for Arts and Humanities) I reflect on this experience, and summarise the lecture.  The lecture itself is available on Youtube.

I don’t blog here…

…but I blog regularly at Psychology Today, and occasionally elsewhere.  This page collects links to my posts.  Comments are closed here, but usually open on the original post.  (Copyright for Psychology Today posts belongs to me.)

At Psychology Today, my posts are based on philosophical research, and on this page I provide some references for readers who want to follow this up.