Why is it so painful to hear ‘I’m disappointed in you’?
This post at Psychology Today was initially published as: ‘I’m Not Angry, I’m Just Disappointed’ (authors select initial titles and images, but these are sometimes edited).
This post was prompted by my research for a forthcoming chapter on trust, distrust and epistemic injustice. For the chapter, idea was that we can harm people by extending either trust or distrust when neither is appropriate, but also that we can harm people by taking an overly-dispassionate attitude (neither trust nor distrust) when something more engaged would be appropriate. (As I have argued elsewhere, these mistakes are easily overlooked when we focus on mistakenly trusting when distrust is due, or mistakenly distrusting when trust is due.) For the post, I used Strawson on reactive attitudes to think about why sometimes engaged anger is more easily received than disengaged disappointment or disdain. (Reading Darwall was also very helpful.)
On further reflection, I think there is much more to say about all this, perhaps via connections with objectification…maybe one day.
What if a toxic workplace environment is making you feel like an imposter? Blogpost at Psychology Today.
This post is based on a talk I gave at LMU Munich in July 2016 (video here), questioning whether ‘imposter feelings’ are typically irrational in unsupportive social environments This draws on my book manuscript about trustworthinesss and competence, in particular discussions of the value of accurate self-assessment. Useful sources include:
‘The Imposter Phenomenon’ by Jaruwan Sakulku and James Alexander, International Journal of Behavioral Science 6.1, 73-92 (2011).
Should we trust experts when we are deciding how to vote? Post at Psychology Today.
Written just before the referendum on the UK’s EU membership, this post draws on discussions about expertise in chapter 6 of my Trust: A Very Short Introduction. It also echoes the literature on moral testimony, as surveyed in
Hills, Alison (2013) ‘Moral Testimony‘, Philosophy Compass, 8 (6):552-559.
Hope can be a first step back towards trust. Post at Psychology Today.
This post draws on my ongoing musings about hope and trust, partly prompted by Claudia Blöser and Titus Stahl’s project on ‘Fundamental Hope‘.
Sometimes too much trust is exactly what our friends don’t need. Post at Psychology Today.
This post is about whether we owe epistemic partiality to our friends, drawing on
Keller, Simon (2004): ‘Friendship and Belief’, Philosophical Papers, 33 (3):329-351.
Stroud, Sarah (2006): ‘Epistemic Partiality in Friendship’ Ethics 116 (3):498-524.
Hawley, Katherine (2012): ‘Partiality and Prejudice in Trusting‘, Synthese (9):1-17 (2012). (Preprint available here.)
What to do when you feel burdened by other people’s expectations. Post at Psychology Today.
This post draws on
Hawley, Katherine (2014): ‘Trust, Distrust and Commitment’, Noûs 48.1: 1-20.