For full details of my publications, please see my CV.

Here is my PhilPapers profile, and here is my profile on the St Andrews research repository.

On this page, I have arranged my publications thematically, rather than just chronologically.  Pdfs are usually final drafts, pre-copyediting; for the definitive version please consult the official publications.  I am aware of broken links for older papers – feel free to email me if there is something you can’t easily get hold of.

Epistemology and Ethics

How to be Trustworthy, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2019).

What is Impostor Syndrome?Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 93 (2019).  Journal here.

‘Impostor Syndrome, Conspiracy Theories, and Distrust’, Philosophical Studies 4, 969-980 (2019).  Open access journal here.

Coercion and Lies‘ in Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics, edited by Eliot Michaelson and Andreas Stokke, Oxford University Press, 229-245 (2018).

Creativity and Knowledge‘ in Berys Gaut and Matthew Kieran (eds.) Creativity and Philosophy, Routledge 60-73 (2018).

Trust, Distrust, and Epistemic Injustice‘, in Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, edited by Ian James Kidd, José Medina and Gaile Pohlhuas Jr, 69-78 (2017).

Trustworthy Groups and Organisations, in The Philosophy of Trust, edited by Paul Faulkner and Tom Simpson, Oxford University Press, 230-249 (2017).

Trust and Distrust between Patient and Doctor, Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 21/5: 798-801 (2015).  Journal here.

‘Trust, Distrust and Commitment’, Noûs 48.1: 1-20 (2014).  Paper available open access on the journal website here.

Partiality and Prejudice in Trusting ,’ Synthese 191.9, 2029-2045 (2014).  Journal here.

Knowledge on Trust, by Paul Faulkner, reviewed for Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 63 (January 2013), 170-71.  Journal here.

Trust: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012).

Critical notice of Knowledge on Trust by Paul Faulkner, published in Abstracta Special Issue VI (2012), 84-91. Open access journal here, includes contributions by Guy Longworth, Arnon Keren, Edward S. Hinchman, and Peter J. Graham, with précis and replies by Paul Faulkner.

‘Knowing How and Epistemic Injustice’, in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind and Action, edited by John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett, New York: Oxford University Press (2011): pp. 283-299.

Testimony and Knowing How, in Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 41.4 December 2010 (special memorial issue for Peter Lipton, edited by Anjan Chakravartty): 397-404.  Journal here.

‘Success and Knowledge-How’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 40.1 (2003), 19-31.


‘Temporal Parts’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (link to encyclopedia).  Original version published 2004, most recent update 2020.

Comments on Amie Thomasson’s Ontology Made Easy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99. 1, 229-235 (2019).  Journal here.

‘Almost Identical, Almost Innocent’’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 249-263 (2018).  Journal here.

‘Social Science as a Guide to Social Metaphysics?’ Journal for General Philosophy of Science 2, 187-198 (2018).  Open access journal link here.

‘Social Mereology’, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 3.4, 395-411 (2017).  Journal here.

Comments on Brian Epstein’s The Ant Trap, Inquiry 62.2, 217-229 (2019).  Journal here.

Applied Metaphysics in A Companion to Applied Philosophy, edited by Kimberley Brownlee, David Coady, and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Wiley-Blackwell 165-79 (2016).

The Logical Structure of Kinds by Eric Funkhouser reviewed in Philosophical Quarterly 66/264 644-646 (2015).  Journal here.

Necessary Beings by Bob Hale reviewed in Philosophy, published ‘FirstView’ on 19th May 2015. Journal here. 

Lewis on Persistence’, in A Companion to David Lewis, edited by Barry Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer, Wiley-Blackwell, 237-49 (2015).

Empty Ideas by Peter Unger, reviewed in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (published online 18th December 2014).

Ontological Innocence’ in Composition as Identity, edited by A.J. Cotnoir and Donald L.M. Baxter, Oxford University Press, 70-89 (2014).

Persistence and Time’ in the Cambridge Companion to Life and Death, edited by Steven Luper, Cambridge University Press, 47-63 (2014).

Cut the Pie Any Way You Like?  Cotnoir on General Identity, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume 8, edited by Karen Bennett and Dean Zimmerman, 323-30. (2013).

What are Natural Kinds? co-authored with Alexander Bird, Philosophical Perspectives 25.1 (2011), 205-221.  Journal here.

Critical study of Truth and Ontology by Trenton Merricks, for a symposium in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83.1 (July 2011), 196-202.  Journal here, includes contributions by Karen Bennett and Kris McDaniel, with précis and replies by Trenton Merricks..

The Structure of Objects, by Kathrin Koslicki, reviewed in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol.24.3 (September 2010), 336-9.

Critical notice of Every Thing Must Go by Ladyman, Ross et al, part of a symposium published in MetaScience, 19.2 (July 2010). 174-9.  Journal here, includes contributions by Kyle Stanford and Paul Humphreys, with responses from Ladyman and Ross.

‘Metaphysics and Relativity’,  Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, edited by Robin Le Poidevin, Peter Simons, Ross Cameron and Andrew McGonigal, Routledge (2009): pp. 507-516.

Identity and Indiscernibility, Mind 118(1) (January 2009),101-119.  Journal here.

Persistence and Determination, Philosophy 83 supplement 62 (2008), 197-212 (special issue on Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics).  Journal here.

Identity in Physics, by Steven French and Décio Krause, reviewed in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science  21.1 (2007), 106-108.

‘Neo-Fregeanism and Quantifier Variance’Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume LXXI (2007), 233-49.  Journal here

Science as a Guide to Metaphysics?, Synthese, 149 (2006), pp. 451-470.  Journal here.

Principles of Composition and Criteria of Identity’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84.4 (2006), 481-93.  Journal here.

‘Weak Discernibility’, Analysis, 66 (2006), 300-303.  Journal here.

Critical study of Four-Dimensionalism by Ted Sider, Noûs 40.2 (2006) pp. 380-93.  Journal here.

Physicalism by Andrew Melnyk, reviewed in MetaScience, vol. 14.2 (2005), 277-281.

‘Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 71.3 (2005), 602-621. Journal here.

‘Borderline Simple or Extremely Simple’, Monist, 87.3 (2004), pp. 385-404.  Journal here.

‘Vagueness and Existence’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CII.2 (2002), pp 125-140.   Journal here.

How Things Persist, Oxford University Press (published in hardback 2001, in paperback 2004).  Selections re-printed in Persistence: Contemporary Readings, edited by Sally Haslanger and Roxanne Marie Kurtz, MIT Press (2006).

‘Persistence and Non-Supervenient Relations’, Mind, 108, (1999), pp 53-67. Journal here.  Re-printed in Persistence, edited by Haslanger and Kurtz.

The Possibility of Metaphysics by E.J. Lowe, reviewed in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 50, no.3 (1999), pp. 478-482.

‘Merricks on whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic’, Mind, 107, (1998), pp. 841-3.  Journal here.

‘Indeterminism and Indeterminacy’, Analysis , vol. 58, no. 2 (1998) pp. 101-106.   Journal here.

‘Why Temporary Properties are not Relations between Physical Objects and Times’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , vol. XCVIII, no. 2 (1998), pp. 211-16.   Journal here.

‘Types of Personal Identity’, Cogito, vol.11, no.2 (1997), pp. 117-122.

‘Thomas S. Kuhn’s Mysterious Worlds’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science , vol. 27, no. 2 (1996), pp. 291-300.   (Essay review of Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions by Paul Hoyningen-Huene, and of World Changes, edited by Paul Horwich.)

Other Work

(co-edited with Fiona Macpherson) The Admissible Contents of Experience, Oxford: Blackwell (2011).  This collection reprints papers originally published in a special issue of thePhilosophical Quarterly; the book includes a new introduction sole-authored by Fiona Macpherson.

(co-edited and introduced with Peter Clark) Philosophy of Science Today, Oxford University Press (2003).